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Abstract. The battery is a key component of autonomous robots. Its
performance limits the robot’s safety and reliability. Unlike liquid-fuel, a
battery, as a chemical device, exhibits complicated features, including (i)
capacity fade over successive recharges and (ii) increasing discharge rate
as the state of charge (SOC) goes down for a given power demand. Exist-
ing formal verification studies of autonomous robots, when considering
energy constraints, formalise the energy component in a generic manner
such that the battery features are overlooked. In this paper, we model
an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) inspection mission on a wind farm
and via probabilistic model checking in PRISM show (i) how the battery
features may affect the verification results significantly in practical cases;
and (ii) how the battery features, together with dynamic environments
and battery safety strategies, jointly affect the verification results. Po-
tential solutions to explicitly integrate battery prognostics and health
management (PHM) with formal verification of autonomous robots are
also discussed to motivate future work.
Keywords: Formal verification · Probabilistic model checking · PRISM
· Autonomous systems · Unmanned aerial vehicle · Battery PHM.
1 Introduction
Autonomous robots, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) (commonly termed
drones3), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), self-driving cars and legged-
robots, obtain increasingly widespread applications in many domains [14]. Ex-
? Supported by the UK EPSRC through the Offshore Robotics for Certification of
Assets (ORCA) [EP/R026173/1], Robotics and Artificial Intelligence for Nuclear
(RAIN) [EP/R026084] and Science of Sensor System Software (S4) [EP/N007565].
3 We have used the word “drone” interchangeably with the abbreviation UAV as a
less formal naming convention throughout the paper.
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treme environments – a term used by UK EPSRC4 to denote environments that
are remote and hazardous for humans – are the most promising domains in
which autonomous robots can be deployed to carry out a task, such as explo-
ration, inspection of oil/gas equipment on the seabed, maintenance of offshore
wind turbines, and monitoring of nuclear plants in high radiation conditions [26].
However, autonomy poses a great challenge to the assurance of safety and
reliability of robots, whose failures may cause both a detriment to human health
and well-being and huge financial losses. Thus, there are increasing demands
on regulation of autonomous robots to build public trust in their use, whilst
the development, verification and certification of autonomous robots is inher-
ently difficult due to the sheer complexity of the system design and inevitable
uncertainties in their operation [9,6,8,34]. For instance, [21] shows the infeasibil-
ity of demonstrating the safety of self-driving cars from road testing alone, and
both [23] and [21] argue the need for alternative verification methods to sup-
plement testing. Formal techniques, e.g. model checking and theorem proving,
offer a substantial opportunity in this direction [12]. Indeed, formal methods
for autonomous robots have received great attention [6,28], both in controller
synthesis, see e.g. [12,30], and in verifying safety and reliability when the control
policy is given, see e.g. [42,18,11].
The battery as the power source of autonomous robots plays a key role in
real-life missions [41]. However to the best of our knowledge, most existing formal
verification studies of autonomous robots, when considering energy constraints,
formalise the energy component in a generic and simplified manner such that
some battery features are overlooked:
– Capacity fading: Over successive recharges, unlike a liquid-fuelled system
whose tank volume normally remains unchanged, the charge storage capacity
of a battery will diminish over time.
– Increasing discharge rate: In one discharge cycle, since the voltage drops
as the battery is being discharged, for a constant power output (a product
of the voltage and the current), the current increases meaning an increased
discharge rate occurs. This is different to a liquid-fuelled system in which a
constant power output typically means a constant rate of fuel consumption.
Thus, usual assumptions, like (i) a fixed battery capacity regardless the number
of recharges and (ii) constant energy consumption for a given action regardless
the stage in a discharge cycle, become potentially problematic.
On the other hand, the battery prognostics and health management (PHM)
community has been developing techniques to accurately forecast the battery
behaviour in both a life-cycle and a discharge-cycle. We believe such battery
PHM results should be integrated into formal studies (either controller synthesis
or verification) of robots to refine the analysis. To take a step forward in this
direction, in this paper, our main work is as follows:
– We formalise a UAV inspection mission on an offshore wind farm, in which
the mission scenario and choice of model parameters are based on a real
4 https:/epsrc.ukri.org/files/funding/calls/2017/raihubs
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industry survey project. The UAV takes a sequence of actions and follows a
fixed inspection route on a 6× 6 wind farm. It autonomously decides when
to return to the base for recharges based on the health/states of the battery.
Uncertainties come from the dynamic environment which causes different
levels of power demand.
– We explicitly consider the two battery features in our modelling and show
(i) how different battery safety strategies, dynamic environments (i.e. differ-
ent levels of power demand) and the battery chemical features jointly affect
the formal verification results; and (ii) the verification results could be ei-
ther dangerously optimistic or too pessimistic in practical cases, without the
modelling of the battery features.
– We discuss important future work on explicitly integrating battery PHM
with formal verification, given the trend that advanced PHM algorithms are
mostly based on real-time readings from sensors deployed on the battery.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present
preliminaries on probabilistic model checking and battery PHM. The running
example is described in Sec. 3. We show our probabilistic model and verification
results in Sec. 4 and 5, respectively. Sec. 6 summarises the related work. Future
work and contributions are concluded in Sec. 7.
2 Background
2.1 Probabilistic Model Checking
Probabilistic model checking (PMC) [25] has been successfully used to analyse
quantitative properties of systems across a variety of application domains, includ-
ing robotics [28]. This involves the construction of a probabilistic model, com-
monly using Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC), Continuous Time Markov
Chain (CTMC) or Markov Decision Process (MDP), that formally represent the
behaviour of a system over time. The properties of interest are usually specified
with e.g., Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) or Probabilistic Computational Tree
Logic (PCTL), and then systematic exploration and analysis is performed to
check if a claimed property holds. In this paper, we adopt DTMC and PCTL
whose definitions are as follows.
Definition 1. A DTMC is a tuple (S, s1,P, L), where:
– S is a (finite) set of states; and s1 ∈ S is an initial state;
– P : S×S → [0, 1] is a probabilistic transition matrix such that∑s′∈S P(s, s′) =
1 for all s ∈ S;
– L : S → 2AP is a labelling function assigning to each state a set of atomic
propositions from a set AP .
Definition 2. AP is a set of atomic propositions and ap ∈ AP, p ∈ [0, 1], t ∈
N and ./∈ {<,≤, >,≥}. The syntax of PCTL is defined by state formulae Φ and
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path formulae Ψ .
Φ ::= true | ap | Φ ∧ Φ | ¬Φ | P./p(Ψ)
Ψ ::= X Φ | Φ U≤t Φ | Φ U Φ
where the temporal operator X is called “next”, U≤t is called “bounded until”
and U is called “until”. Also, F Φ is normally defined as trueU Φ which is called
“eventually”. State formulae Φ is evaluated to be either true or false in each
state. Satisfaction relations for a state s are defined:
s |= true , s |= ap iff ap ∈ L(s)
s |= ¬Φ iff s 6|= Φ
s |= Φ1 ∧ Φ2 iff s |= Φ1 and s |= Φ2
s |= P./p(Ψ) iff Pr(s |= Ψ) ./ p
Pr(s |= Ψ) ./ p is the probability of the set of paths starting in s and satisfying
Ψ . Given a path ψ, if denote its i -th state as ψ[i] and ψ[0] is the initial state.
Then the satisfaction relation for a path formula for a path ψ is defined as:
ψ |= XΦ iff ψ[1] |= Φ
ψ |= Φ1U≤tΦ2 iff ∃0 ≤ j ≤ t
(ψ[j] |= Φ2 ∧ (∀0 ≤ k < j ψ[k] |= Φ1))
It is worthwhile mentioning that both DTMC and PCTL can be augmented
with rewards/costs [7], which can be used to model, e.g. the energy consumption
of robots in a mission. Indeed, this is the typical way used in existing studies,
and differs from our modelling of battery in this study.
After formalising the system and its requirements in DTMC and PCTL, re-
spectively, the verification focus shifts to the checking of reachability in a DTMC.
In other words, PCTL expresses the constraints that must be satisfied, concern-
ing the probability of, starting from the initial state, reaching some states la-
belled as, e.g. unsafe, success, etc. Automated tools have been developed to solve
the reachability problem. We use PRISM [24] which employs a symbolic model
checking algorithm to calculate the probability that a path formulae is satisfied.
More often, it is of interest to know the actual probability that a path formula
is satisfied, rather than just whether or not the probability meets a required
bound. So the PCTL definition can be extended to allow numerical queries by
the form P=?(Ψ) [25].
In general, a PRISM module contains a number of local variables which
constitute the state of the module. The transition behaviour of the states in a
module is described by a set of commands which take the form of:
[Action]Guard→ Prob1 : Update1 + ...+ Probn : Updaten;
As described by the PRISM manual5, the guard is a predicate over all the vari-
ables (including those belonging to other modules. Thus, together with the ac-
tion labels, it allows modules to synchronise). Each update describes a transition
5 https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/manual/
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Fig. 1. (Left) The non-linear dynamics of voltage and current vs SOC for a constant
power demand from [38]. (Right) Cited from [1], the “real data” curve showing a
Lithium-ion battery capacity fade and its PHM predictions (thick green line).
which the module can make if the guard is true. A transition is specified by giv-
ing the new values of the variables in the module, possibly as a function of other
variables. Each update is also assigned a probability (in our DTMC case) which
will be assigned to the corresponding transition.
2.2 Battery Modelling and PHM
Electric batteries exhibit non-linear charge and discharge characteristics due to
a number of factors. The voltage varies with the state of charge (SOC) because
of changing chemical properties within the cell, such as increasing electrolyte
resistance, non-linear diffusion dynamics and Warburg inductance [15]. Fig. 1-
(Left), derived from the experimental test in [38], shows such non-linear results
of voltage and current vs SOC profile for a constant power demand.
A constant power demand means that an increase in current is drawn as
the voltage falls with SOC. For our study, we are interested in a UAV with a
battery capacity of around 11Ah and nominal voltage of 22V. The energy supply
is 180Wh from a lithium polymer battery. For a 22V battery the voltage at full
charge is ∼25V and will drop to ∼20V at a safe threshold of 30% SOC.
The easiest way to measure a change in SOC is by integrating the current
discharge over time from a known initial SOC, called Coulomb counting [17]:
SOC(k + 1) = SOC(k)− I(k)×∆t
Qmax
(1)
where Qmax is the maximum SOC, I(k) is the time dependant current, SOC(k)
is the SOC percentage at the discrete time step k, ∆t is the time step interval.
Although this simplification does not take into consideration inaccuracies in the
battery initial SOC estimation or account for the internal losses, it is proposed
as a first approximation to model the power usage and discharge characteristics
as discrete states using the known battery characteristics.
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Batteries also degrade over successive recharges due to decreased lithium-
ion concentrations so that over 1000 discharge cycles a 20% loss in capacity
may occur [36]. Fig. 1-(Right) shows a typical lithium-ion battery capacity fade
characteristics the (“real data” curve), cited from [1]. We can observe, after the
first 80 discharge cycles, the battery’s capacity drops from 1.85(Ah) to 1.55(Ah).
There is a growing interest in the use of PHM techniques to reduce life-cycle
costs for complex systems and core infrastructure [13]. Battery health manage-
ment is also a critical area in regards to the safe and reliable deployment of UAVs.
Numerous studies into battery PHM techniques have been carried out, e.g. the
use of Neural Nets [10], Unscented Kalman Filters [17,19], Unscented Transform
[4], Hardy Space H∞ Observers [41] and Physics Based models [16]. Although
we are assuming a hypothetical/generic battery PHM method in this paper to
provide parameters in our latter modelling, it is envisaged that advanced PHM
techniques can be integrated in our future verification framework.
3 The Running Example
As UAV technology improves, energy companies are looking to adopt the tech-
nology to reduce maintenance and operating costs. The resident drone idea is
to station a UAV at locations where aerial surveys are conducted repeatedly.
The advantages of such resident drone inspection system are the possibility of
increased availability for data collection (e.g. to feed in techniques reviewed in
[37]), reduced manual labour, improved safety and more cost effective mainte-
nance strategies. We model a typical application of such system in this paper,
based on a survey utilising commercial technologies.
A simplified wind farm drone inspection mission as a 6 × 6 grid of turbines
with a UAV located at the centre is considered. Wind turbines are typically dis-
tributed between 5 and 12 turbine blade diameters apart, so a square distribution
of turbines is modelled, each 500 meters apart, as shown in Fig. 2-(Left).
Fig. 2. (Left) A fully autonomous UAV inspection mission in a 6×6 wind farm. (Right)
The fixed controller of a UAV inspection mission on the wind farm. Intersections and
cell spaces represent wind turbines and transportation channels respectively.
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The drone mission requires the drone take-off and land at the base station,
fly a distance determined by the number of grid spaces to a turbine, carry out an
inspection and return to the base or continue the mission with a single battery
charge. For this mission a drone transit velocity of ∼10 m/s is assumed. An
inspection is expected to take 15 minutes and the take-off and landing time is
estimated less than 1 minute. The battery recharge time is around 1.5 hours.
4 The Modelling in PRISM
Our formal model of the running example presented in section 3 is a product (via
parallel composition in PRISM) of four modules – Drone, Grid, Environment and
Battery. Depending upon the model parameters used, a typical instance of our
model has roughly 100, 000 states and 170, 000 transitions. In what follows, we
introduce the modules separately and describe key assumptions, constants, and
variables used in each module. Given the page limits, we only show some typical
PRISM commands in the modules and omit some sophisticated synchronisation
and parallel composition among modules. The complete sources code in the
PRISM language can be found in our repository6.
4.1 The Drone Module
The Drone module is essentially a finite state machine describing the behaviour
of the UAV during the inspection mission, as shown in Fig. 3. The UAV begins
the mission in a fully charged state (S0) at the base. Once the UAV successfully
takes off (S1), it may either directly land due to violation of the battery safety
strategy (see section 4.4), or fly to the target cell (S2) and then carry out an
inspection of the wind turbine (S3). Depending upon the battery safety strategy
and the battery SOC left after the inspection, the UAV will either fly back to the
base for recharging (S4), stay in the same cell if there are more than one wind
turbines to be inspected, or fly to the next target cell (S2) if all wind turbines
of the current cell have been inspected. Once landed at the base (S5), the UAV
will declare success of the mission if all wind turbines on the wind farm have
been inspected, or recharge and continue the above work-flow otherwise.
The dotted lines in Fig. 3 represent events where the battery SOC falls to 0,
leading to an out-of-battery state (S6). Note, the transition from S0 to S6 means
that the fully charged capacity is not sufficient to do the next inspection at the
target cell and thus the UAV declares the mission failed without further actions.
It is worthwhile to mention that, realistically, there should be some prob-
ability of failure for each action, e.g. 10−4 for landing. However, since we are
only interested in the particular failure mode of out-of-battery here, we simplify
our model by setting the failure probability of each action to 0. Thus, the only
source of uncertainty we consider is from the dynamic environment which causes
different levels of power demand for each action. We will discuss this in Sec. 4.3.
6 https://x-y-zhao.github.io/files/VeriBatterySEFM19.prism.
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Fig. 3. A finite state machine of the UAV behaviour modelled by the Drone module.
4.2 The Grid Module
We formalise the wind farm as a 5×5 grid as shown in Fig. 2-(Right) in which the
intersections represent wind turbines and the cell spaces (labelled by coordinates
[x, y]) represent transport channels. In this study, we assume a given control
policy (CP) of the UAV as follows:
– CP1: The UAV will follow the snake shaped route, as shown by the red
arrows in Fig. 2-(Right), to carry out the inspection in each cell.
– CP2: Depending upon the coordinates of the cell, there can be 1, 2 or 4
appointed wind turbines to be inspected within a cell. For instance, at cell
[0,0], the wind turbine located at the left-bottom corner is the only appointed
one; both the two bottom corners at cell [2,0] need to be inspected; and for
cell [2,2], all 4 wind turbines around it should be inspected. Indeed, it would
be unwise (i.e. requiring more energy) to fly to cell [0,0] to inspect the green
dotted wind turbine in Fig. 2-(Right), rather than fly with the shortest route
to cell [1,1].
– CP3: Depending upon the battery safety strategy and the remaining SOC,
the UAV may suspend the mission and return to the base for recharging. It
will resume the mission at the cell where the mission was suspended.
A part of the PRISM commands in this module are shown in Fig. 4. Note,
the transitions probabilities are simplified to 1.
4.3 The Environment Module
We explicitly consider the environmental dynamics due to its primary impact on
the battery’s power demand. For simplicity, only one major factor – wind speed
– was considered when developing the Environment module. We formalise two
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Fig. 4. Some PRISM commands of the Grid module.
levels of wind speed, and use a parameter p wsp c to capture the dynamics of
the wind. Environmental assumptions (EA) are listed below:
– EA1: The UAV will only attempt to take off in a low wind speed condition.
– EA2: The change of wind speed (either from low to high or the other way
around) occurs, with a probability of p wsp c, before each action is taken in
the Drone module.
Fig. 5. The PRISM commands of the Environment module.
From EA2, we know that the higher the p wsp c is, the more dynamic the
environment, and it is this assumption that introduces uncertainty in the energy
consumption for a given action. The PRISM commands are shown in Fig. 5.
4.4 The Battery Module
Fig. 6 shows two abstracted state machines of the Battery module which run
in parallel to describe the battery behaviour. The battery features of capac-
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ity fading (over successive recharges) and increasing discharge rate (in a single
discharge cycle) are captured by battery assumptions (BA) as follows:
– BA1: After each recharge, the battery’s fully charged capacity (i.e. c full in
Fig. 6) cannot be recovered to the new battery’s capacity. Rather, it decreases
with a rate which can be obtained from battery PHM experiments, e.g. as
observed from the results in [1], for the first 100-ish discharge cycles, at each
recharge, the capacity will fade at an average rate of 0.2%.
– BA2: For a given wind speed, the UAV is working at a constant power
demand for all actions. Since we considered 2 levels of wind speed in the
Environment module, there are 2 levels of constant power demand as well.
– BA3: In one discharge cycle, the battery’s voltage is essentially a non-linear
function of its SOC. We use a step-wise function to approximate the non-
linear function – high voltage V2 (SOC > 0.75), medium voltage V1 (0.75 ≥
SOC ≥ 0.25) and low voltage V0 (SOC < 0.25).
In line with the BA2 and BA3, we use the following Eq. (2) to estimate the
battery consumption (Ah) for an action j (denoted as c act in Fig. 6) under
different levels of voltage Vi and a power demand level k:
Cj =
Espec · tj
Vi · Tk (2)
where Espec is the specified battery energy, Tk is the total running time under a
constant power level k, Vi is the level of voltage, and tj is the estimated execution
time of action j.
For instance, a typical UAV battery with a specified energy of 180Wh (Espec =
180) can fly 30 minutes at the normal level of workload (Tk = 0.5 and k repre-
sents the normal level of power demand). The specified normal working voltage
is 22V (V1 = 22) (with a maximum level of 25V, V2 = 25, and minimum level of
20V, V0 = 20). The average time for inspecting a wind turbine is 15 minutes (if
action j represents the inspection, then tj = 0.25). Via Eq. (2) and those esti-
mated parameters above, we obtain the last row in Table 1 (results are rounded
to one decimal place). Similarly for the battery consumption of each action at
the high power demand level (high wind speed environment), the values can be
calculated in the same way but are not shown in this paper.
Table 1. Battery consumption (Ah) of actions under different levels of voltage in low
wind speed environment (i.e. the normal level of power demand).
low voltage medium voltage high voltage
take-off/land 0.3 0.2 0.1
transport per cell 0.5 0.4 0.3
inspection per
wind turbine
4.5 4.0 3.6
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So far, in our modelling, instead of assuming a fixed battery consumption for
each action, we have 6 possibilities of the battery consumption after an action
(3 voltage levels × 2 power demand levels).
Engineers are aware of the higher risks associated from operating with a
lower SOC battery, thus there are requirements on the battery PHM to provide
warnings when the SOC falls below a certain threshold [35] (and to recommend
that the mission be discontinued), e.g. a typical 30% threshold is adopted by
NASA in [19]. In line with that battery safety strategy (BS), we also define a
parameter safe t as a safety threshold:
– BS1: before each of the actions, take-off, fly-to-target and inspect, the UAV
will check if the SOC will fall below safe t after a sequence of actions to
perform an intended inspection. If there is sufficient SOC, then take the
action, otherwise return for recharging.
An instance of BS1 is that, before flying to the target cell, the UAV will
predict the remaining SOC (based on the current battery health/state and wind
conditions) after flying to the target and performing one inspection. If there is
no safe battery life remained (i.e. SOC< safe t) after the intended inspection,
the UAV will go back for recharging. Some typical PRISM commands of this
module and associated formulas are shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 6. Abstracted state machines of the Battery module.
5 Results
The main properties of interest and their corresponding PCTL formulas are:
– The probability of mission success7: P=?[ F (s = 7)];
– The expected mission time: R{“mt”}=?[ F (s = 7)|(s = 6)];
7 Since we focus on the particular failure mode of out-off-battery in our model, rigor-
ously this should be the probability of seeing no out-off-battery failures in a mission.
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Fig. 7. Some PRISM commands of the Battery module and global formulas. Note, the
key variables c full vary (the fully-charged capacity considering capacity fading) and
c ftt , c ins etc. (the battery consumption of each action, which are generically denoted
as c act in Fig. 6) should be obtained dynamically from the PHM system in reality,
whilst we make simplified assumptions in the source codes.
– The expected number of recharges: R{“rc”}=?[ F (s = 7)|(s = 6)].
We use the PRISM tool [24] to check the properties given different model
parameters in later subsections. Indeed, we may only be concerned with the
expected mission time (or number of recharges) given the mission is successful.
However, PRISM can only solve the “reachability reward” properties when the
target set of states is reached with probability 1, thus our target state here is
(s = 7)|(s = 6). In our later numerical examples, we only show the expected
mission time when the probability of the mission failing is very small so that its
contribution to the average mission time is negligible. Note, this limitation of
PRISM has been studied in [29].
5.1 Effects of Battery Safety Strategies and Dynamic Environments
For a typical new battery with 11Ah capacity, we highlight the verification results
of four representative cases, as shown in Table 2, by setting the above mentioned
model parameters (cf. BS1 and EA2) as:
– #1, the common case and baseline: safe t = 0.3, p wsp c = 0.1.
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– #2, a risky battery strategy: safe t = 0.25, p wsp c = 0.1
– #3, a more dynamic environment: safe t = 0.3, p wsp c = 0.3.
– #4, a risky battery strategy in a more dynamic environment: safe t = 0.25,
p wsp c = 0.3.
Table 2. Verification results of some typical cases with a new battery capacity of 11Ah.
No. of states
No. of
transitions
Prob. mission
success
Exp. mission
time
Exp. no. of
recharges
#1 108,688 163,076 1 4700.20 42.65
#2 117,765 177,278 0.91 3885.95 34.59
#3 108,688 163,076 1 7482.86 72.16
#4 117,765 177,278 0.89 5621.66 53.07
The example of #1 represents the common case that serves as a baseline in
Table 2. Case #2 represents the use of a relatively risky strategy by reducing the
battery safety threshold from 0.3 to 0.25. Indeed, in Table 2, we see a decreased
probability of mission success (from 1 to 0.91), whilst the expected mission time
and number of recharges also significantly reduce, which is the benefit of taking
more risk. Comparing case #3 and #1, given a fairly safe battery strategy (i.e.
safe t = 0.3), a more dynamic environment will significantly increase the mission
time and number of recharges. Because the more dynamic the environment is,
the more often the UAV decides to go back for recharges for battery safety
reasons. Note, the probability of mission success remains (i.e. 1), since the battery
strategy is conservative enough to guarantee a safe trip back to base in all
possible circumstances. On the contrary, if we adopt a risky battery strategy
in a more dynamic environment (#4), then not only the expected mission time
increases but also the probability of mission success decreases (cf. #4 and #2),
because there are cases that the UAV does not reserve enough battery to fly
back to base due to a sudden change of environments.
5.2 Comparison of Models, Disregarding the Battery Features
Most existing verification studies of autonomous robots, when considering en-
ergy constraints, formalise the energy component in a generic/simplified manner
such that battery features are overlooked. In this section, we illustrate the dif-
ference between a simplified battery model and our relatively advanced model,
considering the battery chemical features.
Fig. 8 shows the probability of mission success, via different models, as a
function of the new battery’s capacity (Ah). The solid curve labelled as “ad-
vanced” represents our proposed model considering the battery features (BA1
and BA3). The other curves represent the basic models without considering bat-
tery features, e.g. the “basic high” curve is the case when there is no capacity
fading and the battery always works at a high level of voltage.
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Fig. 8. Probability of mission success, via different model assumptions on batteries, as
a function of the new battery capacity.
In Fig. 8, we can observe that, for a given model, there is a required minimum
new battery capacity to have non-zero probability to succeed. Indeed, the capac-
ity should be at least enough for the inspection of the first wind turbine and a
safe trip back. Since the battery consumption of each action is higher (and high-
est) when assuming that the battery is always working at a medium (and low)
voltage level, such a required minimum capacity increases. Similarly, to guaran-
tee a successful mission, “basic high” requires that the relatively smallest new
battery capacity (around 8.4Ah) due to its obviously optimistic assumptions, i.e.
no capacity fading and always working at a high voltage level.
Note, although the “advanced” model is bounded by “basic high” and “ba-
sic medium”, it is still dangerous to use such simplified bounds to do approx-
imation, due to the observed “dip” on the “advanced” curve in the range of
12Ah–13Ah. That dip of probability of mission success happens because, when
the new battery’s capacity increases (but is still not big enough), the UAV may
decide to take more risk to perform more actions in one trip (i.e. one discharge
cycle), after which there might not be enough SOC left for a safe trip back in
some edge cases (e.g. a degraded battery working at a low voltage in a high wind
speed environment). To eliminate this phenomenon, the simplest way is to raise
the battery safety threshold, which is confirmed by our extra experiments.
An example path of a failed mission is presented in Fig. 9, in which the new
battery’s capacity is 12.8Ah (thus within the “dip” range in Fig. 8). After 22
recharges at step #148, the UAV flies to the target cell [0,4] and the wind speed
changes to high (wsp = 2). At step #150, the predicted SOC after the intended
inspection is higher than the safety threshold of 0.3. So instead of returning to
the base, the UAV continues the inspection in high-speed wind. Although after
managing to return to base, the drone fails to land in a high wind speed and
at the lower voltage level. Also, if we naively ignore the capacity fading and/or
assuming the battery never works at a low voltage, then the UAV would land
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safely in this example. That’s why we don’t observe the “dips” on the curves of
the basic models in Fig. 8.
Fig. 9. A fragment of a failed mission path generated by the PRISM simulator, which
is an example of the “dip” in Fig. 8 with the new battery’s capacity as 12.8Ah. Note,
only key variables of the 4 modules are configured to be viewed here.
Fig. 10 shows the expected mission time (upper graph curves) from the speci-
fied battery models and the differences (lower curves) between them. We observe
that, in the practical range of the new battery’s capacity (i.e. <13Ah, base on
our survey), the basic models could give either too optimistic (500 minutes less)
or over pessimistic (1500 minutes more) results. Such a variance of 1 to 3 working
days will mislead wind farm maintenance activities and thus cause significant
economic loss. Not surprisingly, as the new battery capacity tends to infinity
(i.e. the battery is no longer a bottle neck of the given mission), the verification
results of all models tends to the same value (as do the results in Fig. 8).
6 Related Work
How autonomous robots should be verified is a new challenging question [9,6],
and it has received great attention in recent years, e.g. [11,30,33,42]. When con-
sidering energy constraints, the energy consumption is usually formalised in a
linear way that being generic for both liquid-fuel and batteries. For instance, in
the analysis of robot swarms [22,27] the authors assume constant energy cost at
each time step and a fixed capacity when obtaining energy from “food”. Again,
in the modelling of UAV missions [12,18], a fixed battery capacity and con-
stant battery consumption over time is assumed. In [11], energy consumption
of UUV sensors is modelled as a reward/cost for each state, which exhibits a
linear behaviour over time. Indeed, such generic and simplified assumptions do
not necessarily mean that they are unrealistic, whilst we believe more rigorous
discussions and studies should be carried out prior to their adoption.
The study in [3] highlights the difference between real and ideal batteries,
with a case study on controlling an energy-constrained robot. But it focuses on
another battery feature – “recovery effect” (e.g. a smart phone might shutdown
due to an out-of-battery failure, but then become live again after an idle period).
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Fig. 10. The upper graph curves show the expected mission time, for the specified
battery model, as a function of the new battery capacity. The lower graph curves show
the differences of the expected mission times from the specified models.
Beyond the scope of robotics systems, battery behaviour does draw attention
for verification. For instance, in [39], the battery of a satellite is described by
the Kinetic Battery Model which is formalised as a timed automata to precisely
model the discharge behaviour. However they leave out the capacity fading fea-
ture as future work. Similarly in [20], the Kinetic Battery Model is used for
analysing wireless sensor protocols. For smartphones, [5] uses runtime verifica-
tion to check whether the actual battery consumption is within the expected
limits that are derived from battery consumption profiles for smartphone apps.
7 Discussions, Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we formalise a UAV inspection mission of an offshore wind farm,
and then do probabilistic model checking in PRISM to show (i) how the battery’s
non-linear features significantly affect the verification results in most practical
cases; and (ii) how battery safety strategies, dynamic environments and battery
features jointly affect the verification results.
Most existing formal verification studies of robots make simplified linear as-
sumptions on energy consumption, which is indeed preferable in the case that
the capacity is far beyond the total battery cost of the whole mission (i.e. when
there is no recharges and the battery’s working voltage is fairly stable due to
a considerable SOC margin remaining at the end of the mission). In contrast,
our work shows how such a simplification can significantly affect the verification
results in the case that there are multiple recharges in the autonomous mission.
Thus, we believe our work highlights this risk and calls for more rigorous dis-
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cussions prior to any battery assumptions made in future formal verification of
robots, especially when recharges are expected in the mission scenarios.
Moreover, we believe that battery PHM techniques should be explicitly in-
tegrated into the formal verification of robots. Although in this paper we use
a hypothetical/generic battery PHM technique to provide the parameters used
in the Battery module, it is clear how PHM can aid the rigorous modelling of
battery for formal verification. For now, both the battery PHM experiments
and formal verification are assumed to be carried out in the lab, i.e. prior to
the mission. To improve the accuracy, an appealing idea is to integrate both at
runtime, since there is a trend of doing online battery PHM based on real-time
readings from the sensors deployed on the battery, e.g. [2,40]. Whilst there will
be a scalability issue if running both online battery PHM and formal verification
algorithms at runtime. A compromised solution, in our example, is to invoke the
formal verification and PHM during the recharging at the base (where substan-
tial computing resources can be used) with newly collected log-data from recent
flights. Thus the verification result will be updated with the up-to-date data.
We plan to implement this solution in our future work.
Apart from highlighting the need of integrating battery PHM techniques, this
work only serves as a first approximation8 of the verification of the residential
drone inspection mission. More rigorous verification/planning of the mission is
needed in future, e.g. by gradually refining the fundamental PRISM model based
on observations from various sources of data [31,32].
In summary, our main contributions are:
– We formalise a UAV inspection mission on a wind farm based on a real
industry survey project, which can be reused and extended as an exemplar
for future research of similar UAV missions.
– We do a sequence of what-if calculations, via probabilistic model checking,
to show (i) the importance of considering non-linear battery features in for-
mal verification of autonomous robots; and (ii) how such battery features,
together with the dynamic environments and battery safety strategy, jointly
affect the verification results.
– We discuss the need of explicitly integrating battery PHM techniques into
formal verification of robots, and propose a potential solution which forms
important future work.
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